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Summary 
The emergence of bluetongue virus and Schmallenberg virus in Great Britain (GB) 
during the last decade has highlighted the need for understanding the relative 
importance of the various pathways of entry of livestock arboviruses so as to help 
focus surveillance and mitigation. This paper summarises what is known for the main 
routes of entry and assesses the strength of the current evidence for and against. Entry 
through infected arthropod vectors is considered at the level of each life cycle stage 
for tick-, biting midge- and mosquito-borne viruses, and while there is evidence this 
could happen through most tick and mosquito stages, strong evidence only exists for 
entry through adult midges. There is also strong evidence that entry through immature 
midge stages could not happen. The weight of supporting evidence is strongest for 
importation of viraemic livestock including horses. While there is some indication of 
a common pathway for midge-borne viruses from sub-Saharan Africa to GB via 
Continental Europe, other factors such as maternal transmission in dogs and sheep 
need to be considered in the light of recent findings.  
 
Introduction 
Arthropod-borne viruses (arboviruses) typically cycle between an arthropod vector 
(typically a biting midge, tick or mosquito) and a vertebrate host(s) and many infect 
humans and livestock causing serious disease in some cases. Well-known arboviruses 
that infect livestock and/or horses and are transmitted by biting midges include 
bluetongue virus (BTV), African horse sickness virus (AHSV), and Schmallenberg 
virus (SBV). Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus 
(VEEV), West Nile virus (WNV) and Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) are 
transmitted by mosquitoes and are examples of arboviruses which infect humans as 
well as livestock and/or horses. African swine fever virus (ASFV), Louping ill virus 
(LIV) and Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) are transmitted by 
ticks. With the potential for expansion in range and increase in abundance of many 
important vector species (Estrada-Pena et al, 2012a; Mardulyn et al, 2013) together 
with the emergence of both well-known and previously unknown arboviruses in 
northern Europe, an understanding of the relative importance of the various pathways 
of entry of these viruses into Great Britain (GB) is central to focusing surveillance and 
mitigation. 
This paper summarises the strength of the evidence for and against the entry of 
livestock arboviruses through various pathways into GB and draws on evidence from 
the viruses listed above. Following the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code definition 
(OIE, 2010) for import risk analysis, a risk assessment includes three steps, namely 
entry assessment, exposure assessment and consequence assessment. The entry 
assessment refers to introduction of the pathogenic agent into a particular 
environment but does not include what happens to that pathogenic agent or whether it 
establishes once it has entered. The specific aims are to identify whether a key or 
common pathway is currently emerging, and to consider what further information is 
needed to assess the risks of entry in the light of new data on virus transmission. In 
addition, to address whether resource should be spent on gathering data on routes for 
which there is little evidence regarding entry, the importance of those routes in terms 
of onward transmission to livestock in GB is briefly discussed here. This work does 
not set out to assess or rank the probabilities of entry. 
Overview of pathways 
Information, including vector species, vertebrate hosts, and known risk factors, was 
gathered from numerous references covering a wide range of arboviruses and used to 
produce an overview of the strength of the evidence for the known and potential 
routes of transmission (Table 1). The pathways include entry of infected vector, 
contaminated animal products, live animals and infected humans as set out in de Vos 
et al, (2013). The presence of arbovirus in semen of infected livestock is well-
documented and, for example, SBV RNA has been detected in semen of 
experimentally infected bulls (Schulz et al, 2014). However, biological material 
(vaccines, serum, semen and ova) is imported from animals kept in approved centres 
and is not considered here. 
Entry of infected vector. The relationship of each life cycle stage of the vector with 
both its vertebrate host and environment is an important consideration for the entry of 
virus via the vector. A recent modelling study (England, 2013), for example, has 
shown that, in terms of the potential to generate unfed, CCHFV-infected adult 
Hyalomma ticks that could infect a human or livestock animal within GB, 
surveillance in GB should focus more on adult ticks on imported horses and perhaps 
less on nymphal ticks entering on migrant birds. This reflects the fact that, although 
more nymphal ticks may enter GB on birds per year, each gravid female tick on a 
horse may generate several thousand eggs some of which would be infected through 
transovarial transmission (TOT). 
 
There is strong evidence that BTV and SBV entered GB through adult midges carried 
on the wind from continental Europe (Burgin et al, 2013; Sedda and Rogers, 2012). It 
has also been documented that adult mosquitoes have entered GB in cabins of aircraft 
(Hutchinson et al, 2005). In addition, adult midges or mosquitoes could be transported 
within 8 hours at temperatures of 10-15qC (Van der Hulst, 2004) into northern Europe 
and GB in packed flowers from sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya is the main exporter of 
flowers to GB from RVFV-endemic areas, for example, with the United Kingdom 
(UK) LPSRUWLQJRI.HQ\D¶VRXWSXW+RUQEHUJHUHWDO, 2007). The flower growing 
regions are close to Nairobi International airport (Hornberger et al, 2007) and flower 
packaging operations continue into the night in Kenya with the bright lights attracting 
flying insects (Chris Oura, The Pirbright Institute, personal communication, 2011). 
The number of adult mosquitoes and midges being packed with the flowers, therefore, 
and exported to GB by aircraft per year cannot be assumed to be negligible and a 
proportion could be infected with arbovirus. It is concluded that the evidence suggests 
entry of arboviruses could occur through this route (Table 1).  
 
The larvae of midges and mosquitoes are not haematophagous and thus, unlike tick 
larval/nymph stages, cannot be infected in the absence of TOT and transstadial 
transmission. TOT has been documented for mosquito-borne viruses such as RVFV 
and WNV. Entry of desiccation-resistant eggs of certain Aedes spp. mosquitoes in 
imported car tyres into Europe has occurred (Becker et al, 2011) and a proportion 
could be infected with arbovirus, depending on their origin. A route of entry for larvae 
of exotic mosquitoes is via ornamental plants, e.g. Lucky Bamboo (Dracaena 
sanderiana) which are transported in containers with standing water, making them an 
³LGHDOLQVHFWDU\LQWUDQVLW´0ultiple introductions of Aedes albopictus to the 
Netherlands in commercial horticultural greenhouses were traced to intensive trade of 
this plant (Becker et al, 2011). Car tyres are more likely to be imported to GB from 
China or Japan than from Africa (African Business Pages, 2011) and Lucky Bamboo 
is exported from southeast Asia including China and Taiwan where JEV, for example, 
is endemic (Huang et al, 2010). The available evidence suggests entry of mosquito-
borne livestock viruses to GB through import of larvae and eggs could happen (Table 
1). 
 
Most evidence suggests that midge-borne livestock viruses, notably BTV (Wilson et 
al, 2008), Akabane virus (Allingham and Standfast, 1990) and AHSV are not 
transmitted by TOT in midges. This is strong evidence that entry of arboviruses in 
eggs, larvae or pupae of midges could not occur (Table 1). However, Larska et al, 
(2013) present indirect evidence for the possibility of TOT of SBV in Culicoides 
midges in Poland, and cite a 2005 study which reported the BTV genome in over 10% 
of midge larvae collected in endemic sites in Colorado. There is no evidence that 
eggs, larvae or pupae of midges are imported into GB (Table 1). Indeed, they are 
found in maize silages and cattle dung (Zimmer et al, 2008) which are not likely to 
enter GB in large amounts.  
  
Jameson and Medlock (2009) reported the entry of an adult Hyalomma marginatum 
tick, the vector for CCHFV, on a horse imported from Portugal, and with the recent 
detection of CCHFV in ticks in central Spain (Estrada-Pena et al, 2012b) it is 
concluded that there is strong evidence that arbovirus-infected adult ticks could enter 
GB (Table 1). Indeed, CCHFV-infected ticks have been imported to Egypt from 
Somalia on camels (Chisholm et al, 2012). Similarly, there is strong evidence that 
tick-borne viruses could enter GB in ticks on migratory birds (Jameson et al, 2012) 
and CCHFV-infected H. marginatum have been found on migrating birds in Morocco 
in spring (Palomar et al, 2013). CCHFV has recently been detected in Hyalomma 
aegyptium on tortoises in Turkey and Syria, although importation of wild tortoises to 
GB is illegal (Phipps et al, 2014). While entry to GB of H. aegyptium (on tortoises 
destined for the pet trade) and H. marginatum (on migrant birds) was documented by 
Martyn (1988), entry to GB of Ornithodoros ticks (the vector for ASFV) was not 
reported. Indeed, entry of ASFV-infected ticks for example on imported pigs, to GB 
would be most unlikely because live pigs would not be imported from endemic areas, 
and Ornithodoros moubata ticks, a vector for ASFV, probably complete feeding in 30 
minutes from finding a host (Paul Phipps, AHVLA, personal communication, 2014). 
Some arthropod vectors, most notably the H. marginatum tick are predicted to expand 
their range northwards in the western Palearctic because of climate trends (Estrada-
Pena et al, 2012a) and two infestations of cattle with adults of H.m. rufipes were 
recorded for the first time in central Europe in 2011 (Hornok and Horvath, 2012). 
Moreover, with livestock variants of tick-borne encephalitis virus (TBEV) in Europe 
and CCHFV emerging in the Balkans, pet dogs and cats could bring infected ticks 
into GB. Tick treatment for companion animals entering GB from continental Europe 
is no longer compulsory (Wall, 2012) although under the Pet Travel Scheme (Anon, 
2014) pet owners are reminded that it is considered good practice to regularly treat 
their animals against a range of ticks. 
Infected meat and animal products. The spread of ASFV to pigs by the transportation 
of pig meat is well documented (Costard et al, 2013) and AHSV has been transmitted 
to dogs through consumption of infected meat (Mellor and Hamblin 2004). The fluids 
and tissues from CCHFV- or RVFV-viraemic livestock contain high titres of virus. 
Indeed, direct contact with animal tissues, blood or other body fluids appeared to play 
a greater role in RVFV transmission to humans in South Africa than mosquito bite 
(Archer et al, 2013) highlighting the potential significance of meat and animal 
products as a route of entry. It is concluded that there is evidence that arboviruses 
could enter GB through import of infected meat (Table 1) both through legal and 
illegal routes, with the probability of entry for a given arbovirus depending on the 
prevalence in the country of origin. Thus entry of RVFV in livestock meat (illegally) 
carried by aircraft passengers from sub-Saharan Africa could occur, while entry via 
this route from within Europe is very unlikely because RVF is not endemic. 
Importation of viraemic livestock, including horses. The risks of arbovirus entry 
through this route for cattle, sheep and goats to GB are low (due to import bans in 
restricted zones, and testing of imports from disease-free areas during an outbreak in 
Europe) but not negligible, particularly in the early stages of an outbreak in Europe. 
There is strong evidence entry has occurred through this route (Table 1). For example, 
a BTV-infected cow was imported into GB during the incursion in northern Europe in 
2007 (Anon, 2007). Movement of sheep has been associated with dispersal of LIV, a 
variant of TBEV, in GB and may have resulted in introduction of LIV to Scandinavia 
from GB in the 19
th
 century (McGuire et al, 1998).  The arbovirus typically associated 
with movement of viraemic livestock is RVFV (Sherman, 2011). Indeed, Antonis et 
al, (2013) have recently shown that RVFV can be transmitted vertically in sheep in 
the absence of detectable maternal viraemia. Thus in terms of a route of entry, an 
infected developing foetus may not be detected by monitoring of the ewe, and some 
arboviruses, e.g. RVFV and CCHFV, do not show clear clinical symptoms in 
livestock. Fooks et al, (2014) recently reported the presence of antibodies specific for 
WNV in a horse in the UK with neurological disease. The horse had left Cyprus some 
two weeks earlier and was transported to the UK by sea and road through WNV 
endemic areas in Europe. Although WNV RNA was not detected, this provides strong 
evidence that entry of WNV to GB can occur through importing of horses from 
Europe (Table 1). It should also be noted that there is a potential risk of viraemic 
horses (e.g., infected with WNV or VEEV) returning to GB from Brazil after the 2016 
Olympics.  
Natural movement and migration of viraemic wildlife. Many wild mammal species are 
known reservoirs for arboviruses. However, the English Channel is a natural barrier to 
the migration of most mammals. Viraemic birds are a potential route for introduction 
of WNV and other flaviviruses (Malkinson et al, 2002). Overall 2.4% of migrant birds 
captured in southeastern Sweden in 2005/06 tested positive for antibodies against 
WNV (Jourdain et al, 2011). No such data are available for GB, although it should be 
noted that all dead birds, including some migratory species, selected for testing by 
targeted surveillance in GB were negative by PCR for WNV between 2002 and 2009 
(Brugman et al, 2013). In general, migratory birds are less important for entry of tick-
borne viruses such as CCHFV because with the exception of the ostrich (Struthio 
camelus), many bird species are refractory to CCHFV (Capua, 1998). Although 
grouse are an avian reservoir host for LIV they are not migratory. While Oropouche 
virus (which is transmitted by midges to humans) infects birds in addition to 
mammals in South America (Mourao et al, 2009), wild birds in general do not migrate 
from South America to GB or Europe. Thus it is concluded that there is evidence that 
entry of mosquito-borne viruses could occur in GB through this route, while the 
evidence seems to be against entry of tick-borne or midge-borne viruses (Table 1).   
Importation of viraemic exotic wildlife. The zebra (Equus quagga) is considered to be 
the natural vertebrate host and reservoir of AHSV and levels of viraemia are lower 
than in horses (Mellor and Hamblin, 2004). The outbreak of AHSV in central Spain in 
1987 was due to importation of a number of sub-clinically infected zebra from 
Namibia to a safari park near Madrid (Mellor and Hamblin, 2004). There is anecdotal 
evidence that since 2006 exotic ruminants, including small antelope, have been 
imported from sub-Saharan Africa through airports in continental Europe for private 
animal collectors (Helen Roberts, AHVLA, personal communication, 2014). To the 
authors¶ knowledge there is no strong evidence for entry of arboviruses to GB through 
this route although it could occur (Table 1). Illegal importation of exotic wildlife is 
more difficult to assess and there are many examples of smuggled live birds entering 
European airports (Van den Berg, 2009).  
Importation of viraemic pets. There is evidence that arboviruses could enter GB in 
viraemic pets (Table 1). Thus, dogs are known to have been infected naturally and/or 
experimentally with a number of livestock arboviruses including WNV (Austgen et al, 
2004), VEEV (Coffey et al, 2006), CCHFV (Nalca and Whitehouse, 2007), RVFV 
(Keefer et al, 1972), AHSV (Mellor and Hamblin, 2004), SBV and other 
orthobunyaviruses (Sailleau et al, 2013). However, there are relatively few studies on 
arbovirus prevalence in companion animals. Thus Adams et al, (2012) reported all of 
6 dogs (6-8 months old) tested in a study in 2008-2009 in Mexico were seropositive 
for VEEV. Data are also available for the Everglades virus, which is zoonotic and 
although related to VEEV is not known to infect horses with 4% of dogs in Florida 
reported as seropositve (Coffey et al, 2006). A dog was confirmed TBEV-positive by 
ELISA in Belgium (Roelandt et al, 2011). Of interest is the potential maternal 
transmission of SBV in dogs (Sailleau et al, 2013).  
Travel of viraemic humans. By far the greatest global transport of mammals is that of 
humans and their health is not checked on entry to GB. Although not a livestock 
disease, Chikungunya virus emerged in Italy where the index case was a visitor from 
India (Tilston et al, 2009). There is strong evidence for entry by this route (Table 1) 
and cases of humans infected with mosquito-borne or tick-borne viruses entering GB 
have been reported e.g. Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) (Harvala et al, 
2009) and CCHFV (Lumley et al, 2014). To date, Oropouche virus is the only 
arbovirus primarily transmitted by Culicoides midges to humans (Carpenter et al, 
2013). This is taken as strong evidence against the entry to GB of humans infected 
with midge-borne viruses which also infect livestock (Table 1).  
Discussion 
In terms of the strength of evidence for entry of livestock arboviruses to GB (Table 1), 
the life cycle stage of the arthropod vector is an important consideration, particularly 
for midge-borne viruses. Thus, evidence for the absence of TOT strongly suggests 
that entry of arboviruses in the eggs and larvae of midges cannot occur. However, the 
evidence for entry of livestock arboviruses to GB through the vector is most 
compelling for adult midges, particularly where the disease has previously established 
in livestock in northern Europe. There is some indication for a common pathway for 
midge-borne viruses emerging in livestock in GB from sub-Saharan Africa, via north-
west Europe. Indeed, there is suggestion that SBV was present in sheep in South 
Africa in July 2006 (Leask et al, 2013) and BTV8 is known to be linked to west 
Africa (Meiswinkel et al, 2007). The first step of this proposed pathway is the 
transport of viraemic exotic wildlife by aircraft from sub-Saharan Africa into north-
west Europe where the virus establishes in the naïve livestock population and in the 
indigenous midge population. The ability of midges to fly unaided to GB given 
favourable wind conditions completes the route to GB. More information is needed on 
the first part of this proposed pathway, namely on the volume and origin of imports of 
exotic wildlife from Africa into north-western Europe. In the event of this pathway 
being closed through legislation, attention should focus on the numbers of adult 
midges (and mosquitoes) being transported from sub-Saharan Africa in packaged 
flowers, for example. 7RWKHDXWKRUV¶NQRZOHGJHWKHUHLVQRGHILQLWLYHHYLGHQFHIRU
entry of livestock viruses to GB through infected mosquitoes, although evidence 
suggests it could occur through all life cycle stages of the mosquito (Table 1). 
Similarly entry of tick-borne viruses could occur through the larval and adult stages, 
although this is less of a concern to livestock than entry through infected adult midges 
or mosquitoes in that each tick stage has to moult before taking another blood meal. 
Thus only those tick species which can moult in the climate conditions in GB pose a 
potential risk to livestock. However, there is no longer the legal necessity to treat pets 
with acaricides on return to GB (Wall, 2012; Anon, 2014). There is currently little 
information on the numbers and species of ticks carried on imported horses and pets 
in Europe and the numbers and distribution of horses entering GB on ferries. 
There is strong evidence for entry of mosquito-borne and biting midge-borne viruses 
through entry of imported viraemic livestock and horses to GB. The risk posed to GB 
livestock depends on the virus and the imported livestock species. For example, BTV-
infected ruminants could infect indigenous GB midges. While horses are amplifying 
hosts for epizootic strains of VEEV (Taylor and Paessler 2013), they are dead-end 
hosts for WNV (Fooks et al, 2014) and Western equine encephalitis virus. Maternal 
transmission of arboviruses (e.g. RVFV) provides a mechanism for undetected entry 
through imported livestock. With the exception of mosquito-borne flaviviruses in 
viraemic migratory birds, there is strong evidence against entry through natural 
movement of viraemic wildlife. There is also strong evidence for entry of mosquito-
borne and tick-borne livestock viruses through infected persons although viraemic 
humans are generally dead-end hosts with regard to infecting indigenous GB 
arthropod vectors and livestock.  However, nosocomial transmission of CCHFV and 
RVFV occurs in endemic regions of the World and gathering data on the probability 
of entry to GB of arboviruses through infected humans is of greater importance for 
risks to public health than animal health. 
The presumption of entry through many of the routes to GB is based on assumptions 
with the available evidence suggesting it could occur (Table 1). In particular, data are 
lacking for entry of arboviruses to GB through importation of meat and meat 
products, exotic wild animals and pets.  Gathering evidence for entry of arboviruses 
through meat and meat products is judged not be high priority. First, the risks of 
exposure and hence transmission to livestock for most arboviruses through meat and 
meat products are minimised in GB by the EU Regulations which control animal by-
products (EU 142/2011). Second, many arboviruses, for example SBV in cattle 
(Wernike et al, 2013), appear not to be readily transmissible to livestock through the 
oral route. The exception is ASFV in imported pork meat and Costard et al, (2013) 
have assessed the risk of entry of ASFV into GB through illegal importation of pork 
meat to be very high with a moderate risk of exposure of GB pigs given entry has 
occurred. Although competent tick vectors, namely Ornithodoros spp., for ASFV do 
not occur in GB, the virus is readily transmitted from pig-to-pig through secretions 
and fomites. With regard to arbovirus transmission to dogs through consumption of 
infected meat it is considered here that the focus should be on whether viraemic dogs  
are able to transmit the virus to arthropod vectors, rather than whether dogs are likely 
to be infected in GB through imported meat to GB. This is also a key data gap for 
assessing the potential risks from direct entry of viraemic pets. Thus, while it is 
reported that dogs are dead-end hosts for TBEV (Pfeffer and Dobbler, 2011), little is 
known about the ability of most  livestock arboviruses to cause sufficient viraemia in 
dogs, cats or other pets for them to be able to infect an indigenous GB arthropod 
vector. There is some suggestion that viraemia levels for VEEV in naturally-infected 
dogs are sufficient to maintain the transmission cycle in mosquitoes (Coffey et al, 
2006) although whether indigenous GB mosquitoes are competent vectors is not 
known. In this respect it should be noted that a single amino acid substitution in the 
envelope protein of VEEV enabled switching to a different species of mosquito vector 
(Brault et al, 2004). Peak viraemia levels for WNV observed in cats infected by 
mosquito bite may be high enough to infect mosquitoes at low efficiency, although 
this is unlikely with dogs (Austgen et al, 2004).   Many exotic animals if viraemic 
could infect indigenous GB vectors. It is unlikely that exotic wild animals can be fully 
protected from exposure to indigenous arthropod vectors immediately after 
importation into GB (or northern Europe). Although quarantine may be effective 
against contact of imported vertebrates with indigenous ticks, midges are too small to 
be excluded by quarantine or isolation at zoos.  
In conclusion, there is evidence that entry of livestock arboviruses to GB could occur 
through most tick and mosquito stages, and there is strong evidence that entry has 
occurred through adult midges. There is also strong evidence that entry through 
immature midge stages could not happen. The weight of supporting evidence is 
strongest for importation of viraemic livestock including horses. The weakest 
evidence is for travelling companion animals returning to GB and for importation of 
exotic wild animals to GB. With regard to virology, more information is needed on 
viraemia levels in pets and whether or not they are dead-end hosts and also on 
maternal transmission of arboviruses in livestock and pets including dogs.  
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 Table 1: Summary of known and potential routes of entry of livestock arboviruses into GB; -, Strong evidence does not happen; 0, no evidence; +, 
evidence could happen; ++, strong evidence does happen. 
Route of Entry Tick-borne viruses Biting midge-borne viruses Mosquito-borne viruses 
Entry of infected 
vector - Egg 
0
 
Tick eggs could be infected, but laid in 
soil (ECDC, 2013) and hence not likely to 
be imported to GB 
- Not likely to be infected and 
eggs not likely to be imported to 
GB 
+Imported car tyres (Medlock et al, 2012) 
Entry of infected 
vector -Larva 
+Entry of larvae/nymphs on migrant 
birds, mammals/game birds imported, pets 
(dogs in particular) (Jameson et al, 2012) 
and some larval ticks on birds shown to be 
infected in Morocco (Palomar et al, 2013) 
- Not likely to be infected and 
larvae not likely to be imported to 
GB 
+Entry in stagnant water (lucky bamboo) 
(Medlock et al, 2012) 
Entry of infected 
vector - Pupa 
N/A - Not likely to be infected and 
pupae not likely to be imported to 
GB 
+presumably could occur through 
metamorphosis of larval stage, must 
remain in water 
Entry of infected 
vector - Adult 
+Imported pets (Wall, 2012) and 
livestock/horses e.g. adult Hyalomma spp. 
on a horse imported to England (Jameson 
and Medlock, 2009). Illegally imported 
tortoises (Phipps et al, 2014)  
++Direct flight from Europe 
(Burgin et al, 2013; Sedda and 
Rogers, 2012); +Imported in 
aircraft, e.g. potential through 
packed in flowers from Africa 
+Cabins of aircraft from Africa 
(Hutchinson et al, 2005), luggage holds, 
and potential through packed flowers from 
Africa 
Infected meat 
and meat 
products 
+ASFV entry through meat; CCHFV 
present in livestock tissues/fluids 
+Note SBV not transmitted to 
cows orally (Wernike et al, 2013) 
+RVFV present in livestock tissues/fluids 
but not endemic in EU. Could occur from 
illegal importation from endemic areas 
outside EU 
Importation of 
viraemic 
+Flaviviruses in TBEV group including 
LIV albeit in 18
th
 century from GB 
++ BTV-infected cow imported 
into GB from Germany in 
++ Horse with neurologic disease and 
seropositive for WNV imported into GB 
livestock 
including horses 
December 2007 (Anon, 2007). 
 Note, maternal transmission 
routes for certain BTV serotypes 
in cattle (Menzies et al, 2008) and 
sheep (Van der Sluijs et al, 2013) 
through Europe in 2013 (Fooks et al, 
2014). Note possible undetectable maternal 
transmission route for RVFV in ewes 
(Antonis et al, 2013) 
Natural entry of 
viraemic wildlife 
-English Channel is natural barrier to 
migration of most mammalian reservoir 
hosts and most birds are refractory to 
CCHFV or do not migrate in the case of 
LIV reservoirs 
-English Channel is natural barrier 
to migration of most mammalian 
reservoir hosts 
+Birds and flaviviruses. Example of WNV 
in Israel (Malkinson et al, 2002), although 
dead wild bird surveillance in UK did not 
detect WNV (Brugman et al, 2013) 
Importation of 
viraemic exotic 
animals 
+Note, quarantine likely to be more 
effective at excluding indigenous ticks 
than flying insects 
+AHSV in zebras in zoo near 
Madrid (Mellor and Hamblin, 
2004), SBV, BTV-8 potentially 
introduced in north-west Europe 
through import of exotic 
ruminants from Africa 
+Flaviviruses through illegal importation 
of wild birds 
Importation of 
viraemic pets 
+CCHFV endemic in south east Europe +SBV, possible maternal 
transmission of SBV in dogs 
+WNV in cats. RVFV unlikely as currently 
not enzootic in Europe or in non-EU listed 
countries
1
. VEEV in
 
dogs in New World 
Travel of 
viraemic humans 
++Two cases of CCHFV to GB between 
2012 and 2014 (Lumley et al, 2014) 
-only one midge-borne virus 
known to infect humans 
++one case of EEEV to GB to date 
(Harvala et al, 2009) 
1
United Arab Emirates is a listed non-EU country (Anon, 2014) next to Saudi Arabia which reported outbreak of RVFV in 2000. 
 
 
